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Designing a Regulatory Framework for
Collective Investment Schemes in
Emerging African Markets: The Ugandan
Experience
S. K. Date-Bah*
I.

The Need for Collective Investment Schemes in Emerging
African Markets

In the developed countries, there has in recent years been a
great expansion of the investment capital mobilized by mutual
funds and unit trusts. In many developing countries, particularly in
Africa, the opportunities presented by the mechanism of collective
investment schemes have not been seized upon adequately, if at all.
There is a need to remedy this shortcoming.
Collective investment schemes generally have the following
shared characteristics:
1. They involve a pooling of investors' contributions and, of
course, any profits or losses;
2. Such pooled contributions are then invested in marketable
assets, such as securities, futures, cash and property, rather
than directly in the production process or the service
sector;
3. Such schemes afford their participants, usually smaller
investors, an opportunity to spread risk because they buy
parts of a larger pool, which diversifies their investment.
Unit trusts, mutual funds and open-ended investment companies
("OEICs") share these characteristics. Because of these shared
characteristics, they are useful investment vehicles to promote in
developing countries wishing to mobilize the savings of small savers
through products other than the traditional mechanism of deposits
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with commercial banks or building societies. Though unit trusts
and OEICs are functionally equivalent, they differ in legal form.
Unit trusts take the legal form of a trust while OEICs have a
corporate form.
II.

The Need to Regulate Collective Investment Schemes

Because collective investment schemes mobilize the savings of
many people, many of them small savers, and because of the
management of these pooled savings by others, it is prudent to put
in place a framework of regulation to ensure that the managers of
the pooled resources do not abuse their position. Although there is
a need to encourage entrepreneurs in promoting collective
investment schemes in African jurisdictions, such encouragement
has to be carried out within a framework of regulation to ensure
investment protection.
It is in this context that the Government of Uganda has been
engaged in formulating legislation governing collective investment
schemes. An examination of the Ugandan experience may provide
some lessons on designing regulatory legislation that seeks to
simplify precedents borrowed from developed countries, but which
retains sufficient protection against abuse based on patterns already
manifest in the developed markets, and which may be imitated by
operators in emerging markets.
In Uganda, because of the historical connection with the
United Kingdom ("U.K."), U.K. institutional and regulatory
precedents were adopted and adapted to suit the circumstances of
Uganda. These precedents will be reviewed below, but first the
background to the proposed Ugandan legislation will be set forth.
III. Background to the Ugandan Experience in Formulating a
Regulatory Framework for Collective Investment Schemes
In the early 1990s, The Government of Uganda decided to
promote the development of its capital markets. This decision was
part of Uganda's economic reform process to liberalize its markets.
To this end, Uganda requested technical assistance from the
Economic and Legal Advisory Services Division ("ELAS") of the
Commonwealth Secretariat. Assistance was extended by ELAS,
the first fruit of which was the enactment of the Capital Markets
Authority Statute of 1995. Pursuant to this legislation, the Capital
Markets Authority ("Authority") was established, and took on the
role of actively promoting the development of the capital markets
in Uganda. The Authority identified the mobilization of savings
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through collective investment schemes and the fashioning of a legal
framework for facilitating this development as top priorities. The
Authority made a further request to ELAS to assist it in developing
legislation for this purpose. The legislative proposals discussed
later in this paper are the result of cooperation between the
Authority and ELAS. The Bill containing these proposals has been
approved by the Cabinet of Uganda and has been placed before the
Ugandan legislature.1
VI. Adaptation of Institutional and Regulatory Precedents From
the English Jurisdiction
A.

Unit Trusts

As already indicated, collective investment schemes take two
a company form and a contractual/trust form.
broad forms:
Although functionally equivalent, these two legal forms are quite
different. In the first, the investor buys shares in a company, which
in turn invests in marketable assets such as securities, futures, cash
or property. In the second, the investor contributes to a pool of
funds, which is then invested. The receipt and investment of these
funds will be governed by a contract between the investors and the
manager of the fund. One of these contractual forms of collective
investment schemes is the unit trust as it evolved in the U.K.
Under this form, the contractual arrangement requires the manager
to appoint a trustee to hold the scheme's assets and to protect the
interests of investors by scrutinizing the manager's activities. The
beneficial interest under the trust is divided into units held by the
investors.
One of the traditional rules of English company law, which is
by and large followed in Uganda, is that a limited liability company
may not reduce its issued share capital. The policy underpinning
this rule is that creditors of a company that has issued capital should
not be prejudiced by the company reducing the capital that it has
raised. A corollary of this rule is that a limited liability company
cannot buy back its own shares since this would result in a
reduction in its share capital. In England, the Companies Act of
1985 introduced some limited reform in this aspect of company law
enabling companies to repurchase their own shares. This reform

1. The legislation was published as Bill No. 25 of 2000 in the Bills
Supplement to the Uganda Gazette No.73 Volume XCIII dated December 15,
2000.
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has not yet been adopted in Uganda. In any case, even in England,
it remains true that shareholders cannot realize their investment by
demanding that the company, whose shares they hold, repurchase
them. Thus, the traditional limited liability company is not able to
provide a ready market for its own shares. Such shares have to be
traded on a stock exchange rather than sold back to the issuing
company.
Trusts, in contrast, offer more flexibility on this score. They
provide a mechanism through which investors can realize their
investment by selling their investment back to the trustees. There
was, and is, no rule preventing this. This flexibility accounts for the
development of unit trusts rather than corporate mutual funds in
the English jurisdiction as the mechanism for mobilizing the savings
of small investors through collective investment schemes. In the
U.S., where investment companies were allowed to repurchase their
own shares, the development of unit trusts was unnecessary. There,
open-ended investment companies or mutual funds evolved to play
the same role as unit trusts.
Since a unit trust is not a company, it is not subject to
regulation under the Companies Act. In Commonwealth jurisdictions, a company is usually prohibited from inviting subscriptions
of money from the public unless it is a public company. A public
company is then made subject to regulatory rules, such as the
requirement to issue a prospectus, which are designed to give a
measure of protection to the general public. Ugandan legislation
seems to follow this pattern in the Companies Act of 1961 (Cap.
85), which provides in section 40(3) that it shall be unlawful for any
company to issue any form of application for shares in or
debentures of a company unless the form is issued with a
prospectus that complies with the requirements of the section.
Section 30 also provides that a private company must, by its articles
of association, prohibit any invitation to the public to subscribe for
any shares or debentures of the company. Without dedicated
legislation, a unit trust could escape this regulation of its access to
the public to raise capital for investment. Accordingly, in England,
regulatory control over unit trusts was established initially under
the Prevention of Fraud (Investment) Act of 1939, subsequently
replaced by the Prevention of Fraud (Investments) Act of 1958.
This in turn was repealed by the Financial Services Act of 1986,
which brought in a new regulatory regime for unit trusts and other
collective investment schemes (principally foreign schemes
recognized in England).
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For Uganda, the moral of the English legal evolution is that it
is prudent to regulate unit trusts. Therefore, dedicated legislation is
needed to regulate this flexible investment vehicle.
Under the Prevention of Fraud (Investments) Act of 1958, the
Department of Trade and Industry ("DTI") of the U.K. Government interpreted the Act as preventing it from authorizing a unit
trust to invest in anything other than "securities" as defined in the
Act. It was not until the reforms enacted as part of the Financial
Services Act of 1986 that unit trusts in England have been able to
invest in a wider range of property.
The Capital Markets Authority of Uganda has prepared draft
regulations in anticipation of the enactment of the collective
investment schemes legislation. These regulations, like those
cautious regulations developed initially by the DTI, authorize unit
trusts to invest in securities and money market unit trusts only, and
umbrella funds comprising such trusts.
B. Open-ended Investment Companies ("OEICs")

OEICs are defined in the Draft Ugandan Collective
Investment Schemes Bill ("Bill") as: A collective investment
scheme under which(a) the property in question belongs beneficially to and is
managed by or on behalf of, a body corporate having as its
purpose the investment of its funds with the aim of
spreading risk and giving its members the benefit of the
results of the management of those funds by or on behalf
of that body; and
(b) the rights of the participants are represented by shares in
or securities of that body whichi. the participants are entitled to have redeemed or
repurchased, or which... are redeemed or repurchased from them by, or out of funds provided by,
that body; or
ii. the body ensures shares can be sold by the
participants on an investment exchange at a price
related to the value of the property to which they
relate.
OEICs are thus mutual funds on the U.S. model that could not
be established in English and most Commonwealth jurisdictions
because of the rule that a limited liability company cannot purchase
its own shares. In the U.S., where this strict rule has not prevailed,
the corporate alternative to unit trusts described in the definition,
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supra, has become well established. The separation between the
managers of the scheme property and the custodians of that
property, which is an essential feature of unit trust schemes, is not
an essential prerequisite of an OEIC or mutual fund since the
scheme property is vested in the company and the company itself
may manage that property, unless otherwise required by law.
In the Open-ended Investment Companies (Investment
Companies with Variable Capital) Regulations of 1996, which
became effective on January 6, 1997, the U.K. adopted a particular
type of OEIC that, in fact, imported the separation between
managers and custodians of the scheme property. Policy makers in
the U.K., presumably impressed by the efficiency of the indirect
regulation inherent in unit trust schemes, borrowed an analogous
regime for OEICs that may now be established in England. Under
the unit trust system, as we have already noted, a trustee is
appointed who must meet certain standards. It is the trustee, rather
than a regulatory agency, who directly monitors the activities of the
managers.
Of course, both the managers and trustees are
ultimately subject to the regulatory authority of the Government,
but the primary responsibility for protecting investors by supervising the activities of the manager rests with the trustee rather than
a government agency. Although this separation of managers from
the custodians of the scheme property does not exist in the typical
U.S. mutual fund, the English regulations require it. The scheme
property, although owned by the OEIC, is held by a depositary. An
independent manager, termed an Authorised Corporate Director
("ACD"), has responsibility for managing the scheme property
under the broad supervision of the Board of Directors of the OEIC.
The type of OEIC provided for under the English regulations
is called an "investment company with variable capital." Uganda
has borrowed and adapted this investment vehicle in the Bill. In
recommending appropriate draft legislation to the Government for
consideration, the Capital Markets Authority considered two
options: the first option, like that adopted by Ghana and Bermuda,
was to modify the basic company legislation to enable the operation
of mutual funds registered as companies under the general
companies legislation.
In Ghana, the Companies Code of 1963 relaxed the very strict
rules governing the conditions under which a normal limited liability
company can buy back its own shares. In addition, it relaxed the
normal rules governing public issuance of securities by mutual funds.
Normally, a public company makes an issue of its shares at
infrequent intervals by publishing a prospectus inviting subscriptions.
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A mutual fund may also make an initial block issue, but like the units
of a unit trust, its shares may normally be purchased at any time.
The company meets demand for further shares by increasing the
quantum of its underlying investments. The fund is closed only when
the fund managers conclude that the fund is as large as they are
prepared to handle. But even then the fund remains open-ended in
the sense that the company may re-purchase its shares. The fund
may re-sell shares that it has re-purchased. This implies that the
prospectus provisions governing normal companies should be
modified in relation to mutual fund companies.
Section 319 of the Ghana Companies Code authorizes the
Registrar of Companies to publish an order in the Gazette declaring
a body corporate fulfilling certain statutorily prescribed conditions as
an authorised mutual fund. The order may also direct that, for as
long as such body corporate remains an authorized mutual fund,
certain specified provisions of the Companies Code "shall not have
effect in relation to that body corporate or to invitations to the public
to acquire or dispose of its shares or that any of such provisions shall
have effect with such modifications as are specified in the order."
Under this approach, the Registrar can modify the general
company law regime to suit the operational requirements of mutual
funds. The Bermuda Companies Act of 1981 contains analogous
provisions in the sense that Part XIIA of the Act deals with mutual
fund companies and relaxes the application of the general company
law regime to such companies by exempting mutual fund companies
from specified sections of the Act.
The Capital Markets Authority ultimately recommended a
second option. This second option is that of independent parallel
legislation authorizing the establishment of a particular type of openended investment company, namely the investment company with
variable capital. This option draws on the recent debate, practice,
and legislation providing a special purpose corporate code for openended investment companies in the United Kingdom. The Capital
Markets Authority recommended this course because it avoids the
need for complicated amendments to the existing Companies Act,
thus avoiding unforeseen consequences to the general law on
companies. This approach enables the fashioning of a tailor-made
regime responsive to the operational needs of open-ended
investment schemes. In addition, because of the similar approach
recently adopted in the U.K., Uganda can look to the English
precedents and practice for guidance.
In the U.K., those intending to establish and operate openended investment companies persuaded the Treasury that a free-
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standing special purpose corporate code was superior to a plethora
of amendments scattered all over the text of the Companies Act.
The Capital Markets Authority believes that the Ugandan
legislature will find this argument equally persuasive. Thus, the
kind of OEIC regime proposed for Uganda takes account of
Uganda's regulatory capacity in that it does not overload the
Capital Markets Authority by replacing the indirect regulation that
a depositary can provide with direct regulation by the Capital
Markets Authority.
V.

Overview of the Provisions in the Draft Collective Investment
Schemes Bill2

A. Licensing
A system of licensing and recognition is at the heart of the
regulatory regime for unit trusts and OEICs. Part II of the' Bill
imposes control on unlicensed persons and schemes. No person
may establish or operate a collective investment scheme in Uganda
unless that person is a licensed person and the scheme is either
licensed or recognized. It is a criminal offence for any person to
violate this prohibition. A "licensed" scheme is one established in
Uganda pursuant to a license granted by the Capital Markets
Authority under Part IV of the Bill. A "recognized" scheme is a
foreign scheme that is recognised in accordance with the provisions
of Part VI of the Bill.
The restrictions on unlicensed persons and schemes imposed
by the Bill also extend to advertisements inviting persons to
participate in licensed or recognised schemes. No person may issue
or cause to be issued such advertisements, referred to in the Bill as
"scheme advertisements," unless that person is a licensed person or
a licensed person has approved the contents of the advertisement.
The restrictions also extend to advice and solicitation. No person
may advise or procure any other person to become a participant in
a collective investment scheme, unless the scheme is licensed or
recognized.
The role of the licensed person is very important in the
regulatory regime for licensed and recognised schemes. The Bill
provides for two types of licensed persons: first, persons granted

2. The Bill was published as the Collective Investment Schemes Bill 2000,
Bill No. 25, in the Uganda Gazette No. 73 Volume XCIII dated December 15,
2000.
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licenses by the Capital Markets Authority in respect of activities
specified in the license; second, any "investment company with
variable capital" (the statutory name given to a company
incorporated by virtue of the Bill). The investment company with
variable capital is, in effect, deemed to be licensed with respect to
activities carried out in connection with or for the purposes of the
collective investment scheme instituted by the company. Because
the granting of a license to an open-ended investment company
automatically results in the statutory incorporation of the company,
the Bill quite logically provides that an investment company with
variable capital is to be regarded as a licensed person, without any
need for it to make a further license application.
The Bill specifies the process by which the Capital Markets
Authority may grant or refuse a license application. Only banks,
insurance companies and other financial institutions prescribed by
the Capital Markets Authority may apply for a license as a trustee or
depositary. When the Capital Markets Authority intends to refuse
an application, it must give the applicant written notice stating
reasons for its proposed action. A person receiving such notice has
the right to require the Capital Markets Authority to refer the matter
to the High Court for the exercise of the powers conferred on the
High Court by Part XII of the Bill (discussed infra).
The Bill describes the procedure for licensing unit trust schemes
and investment companies with variable capital, which are the only
types of collective investment schemes that may be licensed under
the Bill. The Capital Markets Authority has the responsibility for
granting the relevant licenses. An application for a license must be
accompanied by the scheme's formation documents: namely, a trust
deed and scheme particulars in the case of a unit trust; and the
instrument of incorporation and a prospectus in the case of
investment companies with variable capital.
These formation
documents must comply with the requirements of the Bill.
As already mentioned, an investment company with variable
capital becomes incorporated as soon as its license as an open-ended
investment company becomes effective.
The Capital Markets
Authority sends a copy of the license to the Registrar of Companies
as soon as practicable. The Registrar then forthwith registers the
company's instrument of incorporation and details relating to the
company, its directors and depositary.
The criteria to be applied by the Capital Markets Authority in
granting or refusing licenses are spelled out in the Bill as follows:
1. In the case of an investment company, the company must
have a depositary independent of the company, and in the
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case of a unit trust scheme, the manager and the trustee
must be independent of each other.
In the case of a unit trust, the manager and the trustee
must each be a body corporate incorporated in Uganda
with its registered or head office in Uganda and in the case
of an investment company, the depositary must similarly be
a body corporate incorporated in Uganda with its
registered office or head office in Uganda.
In the case of an investment company, the company itself
and its depositary must be licensed persons, while in
relation to a unit trust, the manager and the trustee must be
licensed persons. Although Clause 17 does not expressly
state that an authorised corporate director or ACD should
be a licensed person, it is implied from Clause that an
ACD needs to be licensed since it is given an active role,
under the legislative scheme proposed, to manage and
operate OEICs.
The formation documents must comply with the
requirements of Schedule 1 of the Bill.
The scheme must comply with the Regulations applicable
to it.
The name of the investment company or of the unit trust
scheme or of its manager must not be undesirable or
misleading.
The aims of the scheme must be reasonably capable of
being achieved.
The shareholders or unit holders must be entitled to have
their shares or units redeemed or repurchased in accordance with the formation documents and the Regulations at
a price related to the net value of the scheme property, or
must be able to sell their shares or units on an exchange at
a price not significantly different from that price.
In the case of an investment company with variable capital,
the company must comply with the following requirements:
a) the company must have at least one director;
b) the directors of the company must be fit and proper
persons to act as directors of the company;
c) if the company has only one director, that director
must be the authorised corporate director ("ACD");
d) if the company has two or more directors, the
combination of their experience and expertise must be
such as is appropriate for the purposes of carrying on
the business of the company;
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e) the ACD has been appointed by the directors from
among such of them as are bodies corporate and
licensed persons and not prohibited by the Bill or the
Regulations from acting in that capacity;
f) the depositary appointed by the company is
independent of the directors of the company.
B. First Line Supervision and Regulation by the Ttrustee and
Depositary

The proposed Ugandan regulatory regime for collective
investment schemes maintains the separation of responsibility
between the management of scheme property and responsibility for
its custody. This important safeguard for investors is achieved
through the trustee for unit trusts and the depositary for OEICs.
The trustee has the duty of overseeing and supervising the manager
and safeguarding the title to trust property. For OEICs, the
depositary carries out this regulatory function in conjunction with
the ACD. These two institutions bear the primary supervisory
responsibility over collective investment schemes.
As to the duty of trustees, the draft Collective Investment
Schemes (Unit Trust) Regulations, adapted by the Capital Markets
Authority from an English precedent, provide as follows:
1. It is the duty of the trustee to take reasonable care to
ensurea. except in relation to Part 5 (which deals with the
investment and borrowing powers of unit trusts), that the
scheme is managed by the manager in accordance with
regulation 7.01 (which spells out the duty of the manager to
manage the scheme), and
b. in relation to Part 5, that decisions about the constituents
of the property of the scheme do not exceed the powers
conferred on the manager.
2. The trustee must satisfy itself on reasonable grounds and on
a continuous basis that the manager has maintained and is
maintaining sufficient records and is adopting such procedures
and methods for the calculation of prices at which units are
issued and redeemed to ensure that those prices are within the
limits for the time being prescribed by Part 4 above.
3. If the trustee is at any time not satisfied of any matter
specified in paragraph 2, it must inform the Authority.
The depositary serves an equally important role in the
regulatory regime for OEICs. As already noted, one of the criteria
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for the grant of licenses for collective investment schemes is that
there be an operator and a depositary of an OEIC, each of whom
acts independently.3 The Bill provides that all the scheme property
of an investment company with variable capital shall be entrusted to
a depositary for safekeeping. Schedule 3 of the Bill makes provision
for the appointment, retirement and certain rights of depositaries,
and the Capital Markets Authority has power to establish the
detailed duties of depositaries. These provisions on depositaries
ensure that the successful regulatory techniques used for unit trusts,
the separation of responsibility for the management of scheme
property from responsibility for its custody, are imported into the
regulation of OEICs.
The Draft Collective Investment Schemes (Open Ended
Investment Companies) Regulations adopted by the Capital Markets
Authority for promulgation in due course contains the following
more detailed provision on the regulatory responsibility of a
Depositary:
6.05 General duties of the depositary
1. It is the duty of the depositary to take reasonable care to
ensure thata. the company is managed in accordance with(i) Part 4 of these regulations (relating to pricing
and dealing);
(ii) Part 8 of these regulations (relating to income),
and
(iii) Regulations 11.04 and 11.05 of these regulations
(relating to the investment and borrowing
powers and the income of umbrella companies),
and without infringement of any provision of the
instrument of incorporation that relates to1. the initial offer or issue or cancellation or sale or
redemption or pricing of shares;
2. the dilution levy;
3. the valuation of the scheme property;
4. accounting periods (including half-yearly accounting
periods);
5. the calculation of income available for allocation;
6. the allocation, payment or retention of income; and
3.
itself.

The Bill provides that an operator, in relation to an OEIC, means that OEIC
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7. unclaimed distributions;

2.

3.

b. decisions about the constituents of the scheme
property do not cause an infringement of Part 5 of
these regulations.
The depositary must satisfy itself on reasonable grounds
and on a continuing basis thata. the ACD is adopting procedures and methods which
are appropriate to ensure that the price of a share is
calculated for each valuation point in accordance with
Part 4 of the regulations, and
b. the ACD has maintained sufficient records to show
compliance with Part 4.
The depositary, in the context of its role as such, must act
solely in the interests of the shareholders.

6.06 Control by the depositary over the scheme property
1. The depositary shall be responsible for the safekeeping of
all of the scheme property of the company (other than
tangible movable property) entrusted to it and shall
ensure that any of that scheme property in registered form
shall, as soon as practicable, be registered in the name of
the depositary, or subject to regulation 6.10, its nominee.
2. The depositary is responsible for the collection of any
income due to be paid for the account of the company and
shall hold and deal with any income so collected in
accordance with these regulations.
3. The depositary must take all steps and execute all
documents which are necessary to ensure that transactions
properly entered into for the account of the company in
accordance with Section A above are completed.
4. The depositary must keep such records as are necessarya. to enable it to comply with these regulations, and
b. to demonstrate that such compliance by it has been
achieved.
Unlike the trustee, however, the depositary does not have
exclusive private sector authority to oversee the activities of the
ACD. The Board of Directors also has authority under the
Corporate Code,4 to oversee the activities of the ACD as permitted
by the Capital Markets Authority regulations. Paragraph 1(4) of
the Corporate Code provides as follows:
4.

Appended to the Bill as Schedule 4.
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(4)

The business of a company shall be managed(a) where the company has only one director, by that
director; or
(b) where a company has more than one director, by
the directors but subject to any provision contained
in scheme regulations as to the allocation between
directors of responsibilities for the management of
the company (including any provision there may be
as to the allocation of such responsibility to one or
more directors to the exclusion of others).
(5) Subject to the provisions of this Statute, scheme
regulations and the company's instrument of incorporation, the directors of a company may exercise all the
powers of the company.
The Draft Regulations adopted by the Capital Markets
Authority propose that where there is more than one director of
the company, only the ACD has competence to deal with compliance issues. However, in matters apart from compliance, such as
strategy or marketing, the other directors have a right to oversee
the activities of the ACD.
It has been said that where an investment company with
variable capital has only one director, which must necessarily be an
ACD, it is in effect a unit trust in a corporate wrapper because it is
then very similar to a unit trust, which has no board. Where
however, it has other directors, the Board of Directors retains the
right of general oversight over the performance of the ACD.
Indeed, under the proposed Regulations, the Board may remove
the ACD from office, if not satisfied with his performance. The
ACD's appointment can be terminated by a notice whose terms
have been approved by a resolution of the Board of Directors. The
Board thus maintains supervisory authority over the commercial
performance of the ACD, although compliance issues are outside
its authority.
VI. Regulations
Under the Bill, the Capital Markets Authority is authorised to
regulate unit trusts and OEICs. The Authority is likely to regulate
matters such as: how the prices of the product are to be calculated;
minimum portfolio diversification requirements; the kinds of
investments the schemes may invest in; the scope of borrowing, and
so on. These Regulations, when promulgated after the enactment
of the Bill, will constitute another element in the regulatory system
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established for collective investment schemes in Uganda. These
Regulations are to be enforced, in the first instance, by the trustee
and depositary, and ultimately by the Capital Markets Authority
itself. I do not propose to discuss here the contents of the
Regulations, but the existence of Regulations is an important link
in the regulatory system proposed for collective investment
schemes in Uganda.
In preparing an initial set of these Regulations, the Capital
Markets Authority has endeavoured to treat the two investment
vehicles (unit trusts and OEICs) in the same way as far as possible.
Thus, what is being offered is a choice as to form and not as to the
level of regulation. The regulatory burden should be equivalent for
both forms of collective investment schemes. The purpose of the
Regulations is to provide high business standards and adequate
investor protection for both types of collective investment schemes.
A. The Regulatory Role of the CorporateCode
The Corporate Code appended to the Bill as Schedule 4
provides a free-standing corporate legal framework distinct from
that provided by the Companies Act but which has many parallels
to the Companies Act. The Companies Act has certain protections
for investors that are conceptually imported into the Corporate
Code for the benefit of investors in OEICs. Key protections for
investors in limited liability companies registered under the
Companies Act, such as limited liability, ability to invest without
having to manage the business, ability to obtain information about
the business, shareholder democracy, and ability to divest without
residual obligations, are maintained in the Corporate Code.
The main features of the Corporate Code parallel those of the
Companies Act. As under the Companies Act, in the formation of
an OEIC, certain documents relating to the constitution of the
OEIC (the instrument of incorporation) must be registered with the
Registrar of Companies on incorporation (which is automatic once
the Capital Markets Authority has approved an application to
establish an OEIC). The Registrar holds the instrument of
incorporation and the company's prospectus (and their updates) as
a matter of public record.
The investment company with variable capital has disclosure
requirements similar to a public company in Uganda, but probably
a little more stringent. For instance, Part VI of the Code requires
the directors to prepare annual and half-yearly reports. It defines
the powers of directors and of shareholders.
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The main differences between the Corporate Code and the
Companies Act relate to the maintenance of capital and arrangements for corporate governance. An OEIC under the Code does
not have to maintain share capital, as a company under the
Companies Act must. Another key difference between an OEIC
and a public company under the Companies Act is that the latter
must have at least two directors and a secretary,5 whereas an OEIC
may have only one director. However, each director of an OEIC
has to be approved by the Capital Markets Authority as fit and
proper under the Bill before an OEIC scheme is licensed. 6
B.

The Role in the Regulatory System of the CapitalMarkets
Authority and the Courts

As outlined thus far, the Capital Markets Authority is at the
apex of the regulatory system. Although established under a
different enactment,7 the Bill has pressed the Authority into use,
since unit trusts and OEICs will be operating in the Ugandan
capital markets. The Authority has various powers under the Bill
to make Regulations, to make orders, to grant licenses, to give
approvals and to exercise the powers of intervention set out in Part
IX of the Bill. The Capital Markets Authority has the responsibility for implementing the system provided for by the Bill and
making it work in a way that suits the circumstances of Uganda.
An aggrieved party is entitled to refer certain decisions of the
Capital Markets Authority to the High Court. The High Court thus
plays a role as a forum for review of the decisions of the Capital
Markets Authority on those particular issues. These issues include:
a proposal by the Capital Markets Authority to refuse an
application for a license; a proposal to suspend or withdraw a
license granted under the Statute; a proposal to give a direction that
a particular individual is not a fit and proper person to be employed
in connection with a collective investment scheme; or a proposal to
publish a statement that a licensed person has contravened a
provision of the Statute. In all such cases, upon a reference to the
High Court by the person aggrieved, the High Court is to
investigate the case and make a report to the Capital Markets
Authority stating what would, in its opinion, be the appropriate
decision in the matter, and the reasons for that opinion. The

5. See sections 177 and 178 of the Companies Act.
6. See section 17(2)(b) of the Bill.
7. The Capital Markets Authority Statute of 1996.
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Capital Markets Authority is then obliged to decide the matter
forthwith in accordance with the report of the High Court.
Where the matter referred to the High Court is the refusal of
an application, the High Court may report that the appropriate
decision would be to grant or refuse the application. Where the
matter referred to the High Court is any action of the Capital
Markets Authority other than the refusal of an application, the
High Court may report that the appropriate decision would be to
affirm or deny the action taken or proposed to be taken by the
Capital Markets Authority, or to take any other action that it could
take under the provision in question, or to take instead or in
addition any action that it could take by virtue of its powers of
intervention spelled out in Part IX of the Statute. The High Court
thus represents an integral part of the regulatory system of the Bill,
quite apart from its traditional role alongside other courts, of
enforcing the criminal sanctions embodied in the Statute.
VII. Any Lessons?
Clearly, originality is not the hallmark of the statutory
provisions outlined above. But there is no need to re-invent the
wheel. Rather, the principle that can be extrapolated from the
Ugandan experience is that established and successful legal
concepts and mechanisms that exist in developed markets can be
adapted for use in emerging markets. The advantage of this course
is that it takes account of the fact that in a globalised world it is not
safe to assume that deviant behaviour in developed markets will be
unknown to, or will not be imitated by, operators in emergent
markets. In borrowing precedents from developed markets for
emergent markets, what is important is that they are adapted to fit
the circumstances of the country in question.

